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Abstract
In competing risks models one distinguishes between several distinct target
events that end duration. Since the effects of covariates are specific to the target
events, the model contains a large number of parameters even when the number of
predictors is not very large. Therefore, reduction of the complexity of the model,
in particular by deletion of all irrelevant predictors, is of major importance. A
selection procedure is proposed that aims at selection of variables rather than
parameters. It is based on penalization techniques and reduces the complexity of
the model more efficiently than techniques that penalize parameters separately.
An algorithm is proposed that yields stable estimates. We consider reduction of
complexity by variable selection in two applications, the evolution of congressional
careers of members of the US congress and the duration of unemployment.
Keywords: Competing risks, event history, discrete survival, penalized likelihood, reg-
ularization, variable selection
1 Introduction
In survival or, more general, time-to-event regression analysis, one aims at quantifying
the effects of explanatory variables on the duration time. Simple survival analysis con-
siders one terminating event, for example death in disease studies. In many applications,
however, duration can end by the occurrence of several possible events. For example, in
unemployment studies the time of unemployment ends if an individual takes a full-time
job, a part-time job, or retires. Modeling of the event times in the presence of multiple
outcomes is usually referred to as competing risks modeling. Alternatively, one also
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speaks of competing events, competing causes or failures to convey that several events
compete with each other to be observed.
Most of the literature for competing risks considers the case of continuous time,
see, for example, Beyersmann et al. (2011), Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002), Klein and
Moeschberger (2003) and Kleinbaum and Klein (2013). If time is discretely observed, for
example in months, ties may cause problems in the estimation procedure and the model
might become inappropriate, especially for a low number of time periods. Competing
risks models for discrete time have been considered, for example, by Han and Hausman
(1990), Enberg et al. (1990) Narendranathan and Stewart (1993), Steele et al. (2004),
Fahrmeir and Tutz (2001), Tutz (1995) and Fahrmeir and Wagenpfeil (1996), but without
referring to the problem of variable selection.
When modeling the effects of covariates on duration one wants to identify those
variables that actually have an effect. But variable selection in competing risks model
differs from variable selection in models that allow for one terminating event only. While
in simple survival models the impact of an explanatory variable is typically contained
in one parameter, in competing risk models there is always a group of parameters that
are linked to one predictor. This special feature calls for specific variable selection
techniques.
Conventional variable selection methods are forward - and backward-stepwise selection
(e.g. Hastie et al., 2009). However, these methods are frequently unstable and cannot be
recommended. More current alternative model selection approaches use regularization
techniques. In particular, penalization is nowadays widely used to regularize estimates
by adding a penalty term to the log-likelihood. For suitably chosen penalties, stable and
structured estimates are obtained. One of the oldest penalization methods is the ridge
method, which uses a squared L2-type penalty on the regression coefficients. However,
it does not enforce variable selection. An alternative penalty approach that has become
very popular is the lasso (Tibshirani, 1996) , which uses an L1-type penalty on the
regression coefficients and enforces variable selection. Several improvements for the lasso
method have been proposed in the last decade, for example the group lasso proposed
by Yuan and Lin (2006), which can handle categorical predictors efficiently. To obtain
consistent estimates of the parameters, Zou (2006) extended the lasso to the adaptive
lasso by including different weights on the penalty for different coefficients. Further
extensions and alternatives are SCAD (Fan and Li, 2001), the elastic net (Zou and
Hastie, 2005) and the Dantzig selector (Candes and Tao, 2007).
However, these methods are designed for models with univariate response. If used in
multiple response models as the competing risks model they are not efficient in terms of
variable selection because the effect of one predictor variable is represented by several
parameters. Hence, there is a difference in providing variable selection and parameter
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selection. Variable selection is obtained only if all the parameters belonging to a variable
are simultaneously set to zero. The available penalty techniques for multinomial logit
models, which could be used in competing risks modeling, (Krishnapuram et al., 2005;
Friedman et al., 2010) use L1-type penalties that shrink all parameters separately. Thus,
they pursue the goal of parameter selection and not the goal of variable selection as the
lasso method does not enforce that all coefficients belonging to a covariate are shrunk
to zero. More recently, alternatives that enforce variable selection instead of variable
select in multiple response models were proposed by Tutz (2012), Tutz et al. (2012) and
Simon et al. (2013).
In the present paper, variable selection in competing risks models is obtained by
extending these penalties to account for the special features of discrete survival. In Sec-
tion 2, the framework of competing risks for discrete time is given. Section 3 introduces
penalty terms that enforce variable selection. Computational issues are treated in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5, the method is applied to two modeling problems, the congressional
careers of members of the US congress and the duration of unemployment in Germany.
2 Competing Risks Models for Discrete Time
In this section a competing risk model for discrete duration time is considered. We
define the model and embed maximum likelihood (ML) estimation into the framework
of multivariate generalized linear models (GLMs).
2.1 The Discrete Competing Risks Model
Let time take values from {1, . . . , k} and let q = k−1. If it results from intervals, one has
k underlying intervals [a0, a1), [a1, a2), . . . . . . , [aq−1, aq), [aq,∞), where typically a0 = 0
is assumed and aq denotes the final follow-up. Discrete time T ∈ {1, . . . , k} means that
T = t is observed if failure occurs within the time interval [at−1, at). If is intrinsically
discrete, T is the original observation.
Let the distinct terminating causes be denoted by R ∈ {1, ...,m}. Then the cause-
specific discrete hazard function resulting from cause or risk r is determined by the
conditional probability
λr(t|x) = P (T = t, R = r|T ≥ t,x),
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where x is a vector of covariates and r = 1, ...,m, t = 1, ..., q. The m hazard functions
λ1(t|x), ..., λm(t|x) sum up to an overall hazard function
λ(t|x) =
m∑
r=1
λr(t|x) = P (T = t|T ≥ t,x).
The survival function and the unconditional probability of an event in period t have the
same form as in the simple case of one target event and are given by
S(t|x) = P (T > t|x) =
t∏
j=1
(1− λ(j|x))
and
P (T = t|x) = λ(t|x)
t∏
j=1
(1− λ(j|x)) = λ(t|x)S(t− 1|x).
If an individual reaches interval [at−1, at), there are m + 1 possible outcomes, transi-
tion to one of the m target events or survival. The corresponding conditional response
probabilities are given by
λ1(t|x), ..., λm(t|x), 1− λ(t|x),
where 1− λ(t|x) is the probability for survival.
Therefore, given an individual reaches interval [at−1, at), a natural parametric model
for the hazards is the multinomial logit model given by
λr(t|x) = exp(β0tr + x
Tγr)
1 +
∑m
s=1 exp(β0ts + x
Tγs)
, (1)
where t = 1, ..., q, and r = 1, ...,m. Then the parameters β01r, ..., β0qr determine the
cause-specific baseline hazard functions and γr contains the cause-specific effects of
covariates. It suffices to specify the conditional probability of the target events 1, ...,m
since conditional survival corresponds to the reference category in the multinomial logit
model. Conditional probability of survival is implicitly determined by
P (T > t|T ≥ t,x) = 1−
m∑
r=1
λr(t|x) = 1
1 +
∑m
s=1 exp(β0ts + x
Tγs)
.
With R ∈ {1, ...,m}, where R = 0 denotes the conditional survival, the conditional
probabilities are given by λ0(t|x) = P (T > t|T ≥ t,x), λ1(t|x), ..., λm(t|x), which sum
up to one.
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2.2 Estimation
In this section, the ML estimates for the multinomial logit model are given. Let data
be given by (ti, ri, δi,xi), i = 1, . . . , n, where ti = min(Ti, Ci) is the observed discrete
time, which is the minimum of survival time Ti and censoring time Ci. We always
assume random censoring, that is, Ti and Ci are assumed to be independent. Moreover,
ri ∈ {1, ...,m} indicates the type of the terminating event, xi a covariate vector and δi
denotes the censoring indicator with
δi =
1, Ti ≤ Ci, i.e. event of interest occured in interval [ati−1, ati)0, Ti > Ci, which means censoring in interval [ati−1, ati) .
This definition of the censoring indicator implicitly assumes that censoring occurs at the
end of the interval. The likelihood contribution of the i-th observation for the model (1)
is
Li = P (Ti = ti, Ri = ri)
δiP (Ti > ti)
1−δiP (Ci ≥ ti)δiP (Ci = ti)1−δi , (2)
where for notational simplicity, the conditioning on the covariate vector xi is omitted.
Under the assumption that censoring does not depend on the parameters that determine
the survival time (non-informative censoring, Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002), the factor
ci = P (Ci ≥ ti)δiP (Ci = ti)1−δi can be omitted, yielding the reduced likelihood
Li = λri(ti|xi)δi(1− λ(ti|xi))1−δi
ti−1∏
t=1
(1− λ(t|xi)).
Let Rt = {i : t ≤ ti} be the risk set containing all objects who are at risk in interval
[ati−1, ati). For an alternative form of the likelihood, indicators for the transition to the
next period are defined by
yitr =
1, event of type r occurs in interval [ati−1, ati)0, no event of type r occurs in interval [ati−1, ati) , (3)
and
yit0 =
0, event of type r occurs in interval [ati−1, ati)1, no event of type r occurs in interval [ati−1, ati) , (4)
where i ∈ Rt and r = 1, ...,m. That means, the indicator variable (4) is derived from
the indicator variable (3) by yit0 = 1 − yit1 − ... − yitm. These indicator variables are
gathered in the vector yTit = (yit0, yit1, ..., yitm) denoting the response vector of object i,
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i = 1, ..., n, t = 1, ..., ti. By means of the indicator variables (3) and (4) the likelihood
contribution of the i-th observation is given by
Li =
ti∏
t=1
( m∏
r=1
λr(t|xi)yitr
)(
1− λ(t|xi)
)yit0
=
ti∏
t=1
( m∏
r=1
λr(t|xi)yitr
)(
1−
m∑
r=1
λr(t|xi)
)yit0 .
That means, the likelihood for the i-th observation is identical to that for the ti obser-
vations yi1, ...,yiti of a multinomial response model. Given that an object reaches inter-
val [at−1, at), the response is multinomially distributed with yTit = (yit0, yit1, ..., yitm) ∼
M(1, (1− λ(t|xi), λ1(t|xi), ..., λm(t|xi))). Therefore, the likelihood is that of the multi-
categorical model
P (Yit = r|xi) = P (yitr = 1|xi) = exp(ηitr)
1 +
∑m
s=1 exp(ηits)
,
with ηitr = β0tr + x
T
i γr. Accordingly, the total log-likelihood is given by
l =
n∑
i=1
ti∑
t=1
(
m∑
r=1
yitr log λr(t|xi) + yit0 log
(
1−
m∑
r=1
λr(t|xi)
))
=
q∑
t=1
∑
i∈Rt
(
m∑
r=1
yitr log λr(t|xi) + yit0 log
(
1−
m∑
r=1
λr(t|xi)
))
.
(5)
Hence, ML estimates can be easily computed by using statistical software for multi-
nomial regression models after construction of an appropriate design matrix, which we
describe in the following. Let 1t = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)
T be a vector of length q with
1 in t-th position and zeros otherwise and let x˜Tit = (1
T
t ,x
T
i ) denote a design vector
that includes the baseline effect for time period t and the covariate vector xi. With
corresponding parameter vectors γ˜Tr = (β01r, . . . , β0qr,γ
T
r ) = (β
T
0r,γ
T
r ), one obtains for
the linear predictors ηitr = β0tr + x
T
i γr the closed form
ηit = (ηit1, ..., ηitm)
T = (x˜Titγ˜1, ..., x˜
T
itγ˜m)
T .
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In compact matrix notation, the matrix of linear predictors for all artificial data points
that belong to one real observation is then given by
ηi =
η
T
i1
...
ηTiti

ti×m
= X˜iΓ˜ =
x˜
T
i1
...
x˜Titi

ti×(q+p)
[
γ˜1 · · · γ˜m
]
(q+p)×m
.
Finally, for the whole dataset, one obtains with ηT = (ηT1 | · · · |ηTn ) and X˜T =
(X˜T1 | · · · |X˜Tn ) the form η = X˜Γ˜, so that unpenalized estimation and inference for
our model is readily available via standard methods for multivariate GLMs.
Some applications, for example the congressional careers study in Section 5.1, involve
covariates that vary over time. This case of time-varying predictor variables is easily
handled within our framework because all affected formulas in this paper remain valid
if ’xi’ is simply replaced by ’xit’.
3 Penalization
3.1 Choice of the Penalty Term
The linear predictor for modeling the cause-specific hazard function λr(t|xi) has the
form
ηitr = β0tr + x
T
i γr, t = 1, ...q; r = 1, ...,m,
where xTi = (xi1, ..., xip) and γ
T
r = (γr1, ..., γrp). Because there are m competing risks,
each covariate adds m parameters, which increases the need for effective variable selec-
tion. Since the baseline hazard parameters β0tr in addition vary over time, the number
of parameters can be very large, rendering simple ML estimators unstable and difficult
to interpret. To obtain a sparse representation and in particular variable selection, we
consider penalized ML estimation, which uses a penalty term in the log-likelihood (5),
yielding the penalized log-likelihood
lζ1,ζ2(β0,γ) = l(β0,γ)− Jζ1,ζ2(β0,γ), (6)
where βT0 = (β
T
01, . . . ,β
T
0m) and γ
T = (γT1 , ...,γ
T
m) collect all the corresponding parame-
ters. The first term, l(β0,γ), denotes the ordinary log-likelihood, written as a function
of the model parameters, whereas the second term, Jζ1,ζ2(β0,γ), stands for a penalty
term that depends on scalar tuning parameters ζ1 and ζ2. The choice of the penalty
Jζ1,ζ2(β0,γ) determines the properties of the penalized estimator.
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The penalty on the baseline parameters β0 must ensure that the estimated hazard
rates are sufficiently smooth over time. Concerning the covariate effects γ, our goal
is variable selection, that is, finding those covariates that are influential at predicting
hazard rates or survival. It immediately follows from (1) that the influence of a variable,
say xj, is only removed from the model if all of its effects γ
T
j = (γ1j, ..., γmj) are set to
zero simultaneously. For example, if we have γˆ1j = 0 and γˆ2j 6= 0, then λˆ1(t|x) would
still be influenced by xj.
A penalty that enforces such a structured and thus effective variable selection and
that smooths the baseline hazards over time is given by
Jζ1,ζ2(β0,γ) = ζ1
m∑
r=1
q∑
t=2
(β0tr − β0,t−1,r)2 + ζ2
p∑
j=1
φj
∥∥γ j∥∥
= ζ1J1(β0) + ζ2J2(γ),
(7)
where ‖u‖ = ‖u‖2 =
√
uTu denotes the L2-norm and φj =
√
m is a weight that adjusts
the penalty level on parameter vectors γ j for their dimension. The first term in (7)
uses that time intervals are ordered. Therefore, for each cause r, differences between co-
efficients of adjacent time periods are penalized in a similar way as in penalized splines
(Eilers and Marx, 1996) and regression with ordered predictors (Gertheiss and Tutz,
2009). The penalty controls how quickly hazard rates can change and hence smooths
them over time. The second term enforces variable selection, that means, all parameters
collected in γ j are simultaneously shrunk towards zero. It is strongly related to the
group lasso method (Yuan and Lin, 2006), but in the group lasso the grouping refers to
the parameters that are linked to the dummies of a categorical predictor within a univari-
ate regression model, while in the present model grouping arises from the multivariate
model structure. The strength of the penalty terms is determined by the tuning param-
eters ζ1 and ζ2. Without a penalty, that is with ζ1 = ζ2 = 0, ordinary ML-estimation is
obtained.
3.2 Complexity Reduction by Incorporating Splines
Even though penalty (7) smooths the cause-specific baseline coefficients β0 and hence
reduces their effective dimensionality, one might want to reduce their complexity a priori,
for example if the number of time periods q is very large. To simplify the baseline effects,
they can be expanded in basis functions, for example in an equidistant, low-rank B-spline
basis, resulting in
β0tr =
dr∑
s=1
α0srBs(t)
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with dr < q. The incorporation of B-splines yields more parsimonious models, but
requires a modification of the penalty term which is given by
Jζ1,ζ2(α0,γ) = ζ1
m∑
r=1
dr∑
s=2
(α0sr − α0,s−1,r)2 + ζ2
p∑
j=1
φj
∥∥γ j∥∥ . (8)
Again, the first term of the penalty steers the smoothness of the baseline effects, whereas
the second term enforces variable selection.
3.3 Adaptive Penalties
Since penalization necessarily introduces bias (which grows with ζ2), the choice of this
tuning parameter involves a tradeoff between ’sharp’ variable selection and unbiasedness.
In the light of this conflict, the common penalty level ζ2 in the penalties (7) and (8)
cannot be an optimal choice. As was shown by Zou (2006) for the simple lasso and by
Wang and Leng (2008) for the group lasso the methods are inconsistent if used with a
common penalty parameter. The proposed remedy are so-called adaptive weights, which
for the penalties (7) or (8) are obtained by replacing the weights φj by
φaj =
√
m
||γˆInitj ||
, (9)
where γˆInitj denotes an appropriate initial estimator. For our model, γˆ
Init
j is the penalized
estimator that results from application of penalties (7) or (8) with ζ2 = 0. Thus, the
initial estimator uses unpenalized covariate effects, but an active smoothing penalty on
the baseline effects.
The intuition behind this weighting procedure is rather straightforward. Assuming
that all predictors are centered around zero and standardized to a common variance, the
norm of unpenalized estimates for the parameter groups is rather large if they belong
to strong predictors and small otherwise. Consequently, the corresponding penalization
is small/large for strong/weak predictors, respectively. Zou (2006) and Wang and Leng
(2008) prove that these penalized estimators provide consistent variable selection if used
with adaptive weights. In Tutz et al. (2012), the improved performance of adaptive
penalties was empirically confirmed for the multinomial logit model.
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4 Computational Issues
In the following, some details regarding the computation of numerical estimates are
described. First, details of the estimation approach itself are outlined, then the tuning
parameter selection for discrete competing risk models is presented.
4.1 Numerical Estimates
To estimate the parameters β0 and γ, the penalized log-likelihood lζ1,ζ2(β0,γ) from (6)
has to be maximized, which can also be formulated as
(βˆ0, γˆ) = argmin
β0,γ
(
− l(β0,γ) + ζ1J1(β0) + ζ2J2(γ)
)
. (10)
Our algorithm for solving (10) is based on proximal gradient algorithms, for an overview,
see Parikh and Boyd (2013). The key building block is the so-called proximal operator,
which for a generic search point v and a generic penalty ζJ(·) is defined as
Prox ζJ(v) = argmin
u
(
||u− v||22 + ζJ(u)
)
. (11)
For s = 0, 1, 2, . . . until convergence, the proximal gradient iterations are given by
βˆ
(s+1)
0 = Prox ζ1/ν(s)·J1
v(s) := βˆ(s)0 + 1ν(s) · ∂l
(
βˆ
(s)
0 , γˆ
(s)
)
∂β0
 (12)
and
γˆ(s+1) = Prox ζ2/ν(s)·J2
w(s) := γˆ(s) + 1
ν(s)
· ∂l
(
βˆ
(s)
0 , γˆ
(s)
)
∂γ
 , (13)
where ν(s) > 0 is an inverse stepsize parameter. In (12) and (13), it was exploited that
both the overall penalty term Jζ1,ζ2 (see (7)) and the L
2
2-term in (11) can be decomposed
into nonoverlapping parts that only contain either β0 or γ. The search points v and
w for β0 and γ, respectively, are obtained from a first order approximation of the
log-likelihood term in (10) and can be considered a one-step approximation of the ML
estimator, based on the current solution. Applying the proximal operator to these search
points incorporates the penalties and ensures solutions with structured sparsity.
Since the penalty on the γ-parameters in (7) is a groupwise L2-norm, the solution
to (13) is obtained by blockwise application of the well-known group-soft-thresholding
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operator. Let J2(γ) =
∑p
j=1 φj||γ j|| =
∑p
j=1 J2j and let w be partitioned like γ. Then,
one obtains with (u)+ = max(u, 0) the analytical solution
Prox ζ2/ν·J2j(w j) =
(
1− ζ2φj/ν||w j||
)
+
w j, j = 1, . . . , p.
To derive a closed solution to (12), we rewrite the penalty on the baseline parameters:
J1(β0) =
∑m
r=1
∑q
t=2(β0tr−β0,t−1,r)2 =
∑m
r=1 J1r. Let D denote the first-order difference
matrix, that is,
D =

−1 1 0
−1 1
. . .
0 −1 1
 ,
so that we have J1r = ||Dβ0r||22. Hence, the proximal operator in (12) only contains
quadratic terms and thus, with Ω = DTD and identity matrix I, admits an analytical
solution:
Prox ζ1/ν·J1r(v r) =
(
I + ζ1
ν
Ω
)−1
v r, r = 1, . . . ,m. (14)
To the best of our knowledge, formula (14) has never been explicitly given in the litera-
ture.
The steps described above are crucial and sufficient for the computation of numer-
ical estimates with proximal gradient algorithms. However, our implementation uses
an accelerated version of proximal gradient, the so-called Fast Iterative Shrinkage and
Thresholding Algorithm (FISTA) of Beck and Teboulle (2009). By a technical modi-
fication to the search points in (12) and (13), FISTA achieves quadratic convergence,
which is optimal within the class of first-order algorithms. The proposed algorithm is
an extension of the algorithm given in Tutz et al. (2012). The latter contains only one
penalty term, which is enough when modeling multinomial logit models but not when
modeling survival.
4.2 Tuning Parameter Selection
The tuning parameters ζ1 and ζ2 are chosen by k-fold cross-validation (Hastie et al., 2009)
over a two-dimensional grid of possible values. However, a modification to standard
cross-validation is required due to the data blow up described in Section 2.2.
For folds s = 1, . . . , k, let Is denote the index set of observations that belong to fold
s and let λˆ
(−s)
r denote the estimate for λr that is based on all observations except for
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those in Is. As the criterion to be cross-validated, we use the (predictive) deviance.
With the introduced notation, the cross-validated deviance is defined by
DCV = 2
K∑
s=1
∑
i∈Is
ti∑
t=1
m∑
r=0
yitr log(
yitr
λˆr(t|xi)(−s)
). (15)
Hence, all (m + 1) · ti data points yitr that belong to the same original observation i
are always assigned to the same cross-validation fold. The dependence of λˆr (and thus
DCV ) on ζ1 and ζ2 has been suppressed in the notation to improve readability.
5 Applications
In this section, the proposed penalized competing risk model with discrete duration time
is applied to two real data problems. The first data set describes Congressional careers
in the United States. Unemployment data taken from the German socioeconomic panel
constitute the second data set.
Variable Description
Duration Time (in terms served) the incumbent has spent in Congress prior to the election
cycle
Age Incumbent’s age (in years) at each election cycle, centered around 51
Republican Member of the Republican party
0: no, 1: yes
PriorMargin The incumbent’s margin of victory in his or her previous election, centered around 35
Leadership Prestige position
0: otherwise, 1: member is in the House leadership and/or is a chair of a standing
House committee
OpenGub Open gubernatorial seat available in the incumbent’s state
0: no, 1: yes
OpenSen Open Senatorial seat available in the incumbent’s state
0: no, 1: yes
Scandal Incumbent was involved in an ethical or sexual misconduct scandal or when the
incumbent was under criminal investigation
0: no, 1: yes
Redistricting The incumbent’s district was substantially redistricted
0: no, 1: yes
Table 1: Description of the variables of the Congressional career data.
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Figure 1: Cross validation score subject to penalty parameter ζ2 for ζ1 = 6.0 for the
Congressional career data.
5.1 Congressional Careers
The first data example deals with careers of incumbent members of the U.S.
Congress. A detailed description can be found in the book of Box-Steffensmeier
and Jones (2004) and in Jones (1994). It can be downloaded from the website
http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/bsjjones/eventhistory.html. A congressman can
end his legislative career in four different ways. He might retire (retirement), he might
be ambitious and seek an alternative office (ambition), he might lose a primary election
(primary) or he might lose a general election (general). The dependent variable is
defined by the transition process of a Congressman from his first election up to one
of the competing events general, primary, retirement or ambition. The duration until
the occurrence of one of the competing events is measured as terms served, where
a maximum of 16 terms can be reached. Career path data were collected on every
member of the House of Representatives from each freshman class elected from 1950
to 1976. Each incumbent in the data set was tracked from the first reelection bid until
the last term served in office. A member initially elected in 1950 does not enter the
risk set until the election cycle of 1952 as the members of the House of Representatives
serve two-year terms. At each subsequent election, a terminating event or reelection
is observed. Once a terminating event is experienced, the incumbent is no longer
observed. The data set covers all election cycles from 1952 up to 1992.
Originally, up to 20 terms occurred, however, only for very few Congressmen. Hence,
due to stability reasons, durations that exceed 15 terms have been aggregated. Further-
more, only complete cases, that is, observations with no missing values for any covariate,
have been incorporated in the analysis. The used data set contains the career paths of
860 Congressmen. Several covariates are available as predictors for the end of careers.
The covariate age gives the incumbent’s age at each election cycle and, to improve inter-
pretability, is centered around 51 years (sample mean: 51.26). The incumbent’s margin
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of victory in his or her previous election is collected in the variable priorMargin, which
is centered around a margin of 35 (sample mean: 35.21). The covariate redistricting in-
dicates if the incumbent’s district was substantially redistricted. The covariate scandal
captures if an incumbent was involved in an ethical or sexual misconduct scandal or if
the incumbent was under criminal investigation. The covariates openGub and openSen
indicate if there is an open gubernatorial and/or open Senatorial seat available in the in-
cumbent’s state. The data set considers members of the Republican and the Democratic
party. Whether the Congressman is a member of the Republican party is gathered in the
variable republican. Finally, leadership describes if a member is in the House leadership
and/or is a chair of a standing House committee. With the exception of the predictor
republican all covariates are time-varying, that is, the covariate values per object may
vary over the duration time. An overview of the used predictors is shown in Table 1.
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Figure 2: Parameter estimates of the cause-specific time-varying baseline effects for the
Congressional careers data. Dashed lines represent the 95% pointwise bootstrap interval.
We fitted a penalized multinomial logit model with risks defined by cause 1 (Gen-
eral), 2 (Primary), 3 (Retirement) and 4 (Ambition). The effect of covariates in the
model λr(t|x) = exp(ηitr)/(1 +
∑4
j=1 exp(ηitj)) is specified by the cause-specific linear
predictors ηitr = β0tr + x
T
itγr. All covariates described in Table 1 are incorporated in
the predictors. To be on comparable scales, all covariates were standardized to have
equal variance. Moreover, we included all pairwise interactions with the exception of
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General Primary Retirement Ambition
ML pen. sd ML pen. sd ML pen. sd ML pen. sd
Age 0.069 0.046 0.008 0.071 0.046 0.011 0.070 0.068 0.008 -0.034 -0.037 0.007
Republican 0.255 0 0.005 -0.188 0 0.002 -0.201 0 0.009 0.343 0 0.018
PriorMargin -0.078 -0.060 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.005 -0.007 -0.005 0.003 -0.010 -0.004 0.002
Leadership -0.272 0 0.087 -2.779 0 0.081 -0.393 0 0.065 0.033 0 0.080
Open Gub. 0.815 0.205 0.116 0.598 0.181 0.097 0.227 0.109 0.077 0.528 0.208 0.121
Open Sen. -0.638 -0.243 0.125 -0.215 -0.193 0.134 -0.086 0.062 0.125 1.136 0.878 0.134
Scandal 3.750 2.689 0.370 3.215 3.272 0.428 1.921 1.611 0.441 -3.118 -1.532 0.073
Redistricting 2.548 1.617 0.447 1.465 1.149 0.499 -0.563 0.431 0.251 0.574 0.801 0.309
Age:Republican 0.007 0.011 0.007 -0.045 -0.010 0.007 0.041 0.030 0.009 -0.038 -0.029 0.009
Age:PriorMargin 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000
Age:Leadership 0.014 0 0.002 -0.117 0 0.002 0.018 0 0.002 -0.269 0 0.001
Age:OpenGub. -0.006 0 0 0.034 0 0 -0.016 0 0 -0.011 0 0
Age:OpenSen. -0.005 0 0.001 -0.074 0 0.001 -0.039 0 0.004 -0.015 0 0.002
Age:Scandal -0.106 0 0 0.022 0 0 0.090 0 0 0.009 0 0
Age:Redistricting -0.001 0.007 0.016 -0.066 -0.039 0.018 0.174 0.097 0.031 0.037 0.018 0.016
Republican:PriorMargin 0.016 0.005 0.004 -0.041 -0.016 0.005 -0.008 -0.004 0.004 0.015 0.012 0.004
Republican:OpenGub. -0.532 -0.342 0.200 -4.282 -1.337 0.147 -0.147 -0.233 0.201 -0.063 0.294 0.184
Republican:OpenSen. 0.323 0 0.001 -0.092 0 0.002 0.802 0 0.010 -0.260 0 0.011
Republican:Scandal 0.007 0 0.021 2.121 0 0.054 0.182 0 0.005 -1.418 0 0.001
Republican:Redistricting -1.833 0 0.076 0.447 0 0.059 1.247 0 0.050 -0.276 0 0.051
PriorMargin:Leadership 0.025 0 0 -0.009 0 0 -0.008 0 0.001 0.057 0 0
PriorMargin:OpenGub. 0.020 0 0 -0.001 0 0.001 0.008 0 0.001 0.009 0 0.001
PriorMargin:OpenSen. -0.016 0 0.001 -0.019 0 0.002 0.013 0 0.002 0.011 0 0.004
PriorMargin:Scandal 0.006 0.007 0.005 -0.017 -0.010 0.004 -0.071 -0.019 0.006 -0.028 -0.001 0
PriorMargin:Redistricting 0.066 0.037 0.019 0.000 -0.002 0.003 0.030 0.010 0.006 -0.013 -0.009 0.007
Leadership:OpenGub. -5.168 0 0.117 -1.693 0 0.087 1.054 0 0.359 -5.402 0 0.116
Leadership:OpenSen. -4.513 0 0 -0.941 0 0 1.001 0 0 -6.053 0 0
Leadership:Scandal -0.213 -0.029 0.594 -4.212 -1.803 0.733 -8.621 -1.925 0.756 -0.897 -0.108 0.047
OpenGub.:OpenSen. -0.436 0 0 0.124 0 0 -0.280 0 0 -0.429 0 0
OpenGub.:Redistricting -0.175 0.172 0.663 -4.274 -0.415 0.125 -5.297 -0.666 0.237 2.751 2.126 0.932
OpenSen.:Scandal -2.277 0 0.307 -1.482 0 0.206 -8.270 0 0.266 -3.311 0 0.058
OpenSen.:Redistricting 0.914 0 0.052 -4.560 0 0.006 -0.522 0 0.031 1.771 0 0.147
Table 2: Parameter estimates for the Congressional careers data. Ordinary maximum
likelihood estimates are denoted by “ML”, the penalized estimates are denoted by “pen.”.
Estimated standard errors for the penalized model obtained by a bootstrap approach are
given in the columns denoted by “sd”.
Republican:Leadership, Leadership:Redistricting, Opengub:Scandal, Scandal:Redistricting
because too few observations of the corresponding combinations are in the data. Such
a high-dimensional interaction model cannot be properly handled by unpenalized ML
estimation but stable estimation and efficient variable selection is obtained by using
penalization.
Since the adaptive version of the penalty yielded better cross-validation score, adap-
tive weights were used. Tuning parameters ζ1 and ζ2 were chosen on a 2-dimensional
grid by 5-fold cross validation with the predictive deviance as loss criterion. The
resulting tuning parameters were ζ1 = 6.0 and ζ2 = 2.64. For a fixed ζ1 = 6.0, the
corresponding cross validation score is shown in Figure 1, where the vertical black
dashed line marks the chosen tuning parameter.
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Figure 2 shows the parameter estimates for the cause-specific time-varying baseline
effects. The corresponding pointwise confidence intervals, marked by light-gray dashed
lines, have been estimated by a nonparametric bootstrap method as proposed by
Efron (1979) with 1000 bootstrap replications. It can be seen that cause-specific
baseline effects are necessary because the shapes are quite different. For retirement, the
parameters are increasing over early terms and then become stable while for ambition
there is an early peak at about five terms and then a decrease. Due to the penalization
of adjacent coefficients β0tr − β0,t−1,r, the estimated baseline effects are rather smooth.
Parameter estimates of the covariate effects are summarized in Table 2. It shows the
ordinary ML estimates and the estimates resulting from the penalized competing risk
model with their corresponding standard errors. The computation of the standard errors
is based on a nonparametric bootstrap approach with 1000 bootstrap replications. It is
immediately seen that the penalization removes a considerable number of effects, that
is, only 68 out of 128 parameters remain in the model, leading to a strong reduction of
the model complexity. The selection procedure suggests that the main effects Republican
and Leadership are not needed in the predictor. Moreover, a large number of interaction
effects were not selected. Concerning interpretation, for example, the absolute values of
the covariate Scandal indicates a strong effect. If a Congressman became embroiled in
a scandal it is more likely that he/she loses a primary or general election or that he/she
retires. In contrast, a scandal decreases the probability of seeking an alternative office
as compared to reelection.
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(a) Estimated rates for all predictors
at reference: Age=51, Prior Mar-
gin=35, no Republican, no Leader-
ship, no open Gubernatorial seat,
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(b) Estimated rates for Age=41, Prior
Margin=35, no Republican, no
Leadership, no open Gubernatorial
seat, no open Senatorial seat, no
Scandal and no Redistricting.
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(c) Estimated rates for Age=61, Prior
Margin=35, no Republican, no
Leadership, no open Gubernatorial
seat, no open Senatorial seat, no
Scandal and no Redistricting.
Figure 3: Estimated cause-specific hazard rates over time for the Congressional careers
data.
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Figure 4: Coefficients paths of the main effects for the Congressional career data.
In Figure 3 a selection of resulting hazard rates is depicted. It shows hazard functions
for the following covariate characteristics: Age=51, Prior Margin=35, no Republican,
no Leadership, no open Gubernatorial seat, no open Senatorial seat, no Scandal and no
Redistricting for the transitions to General, Primary, Retirement and Ambition. It can
be seen that the probability of retirement tends to increase over early terms and then
remains rather stable. The probability for seeking an alternative office as compared to
reelection increases for early terms and then decreases. The hazard rates for losing either
a primary or a general election are rather constant in the considered group. Figures 3b
and 3c show the hazard rates respectively for younger (Age=41) and older (Age=61)
Congressmen compared to the reference group (Age=51), while everything else remains
unchanged. Younger Congressmen prefer to seek an alternative office and they do not
intend to retire. For older Congressmen, the probability of retirement compared to
reelection strongly increases. Moreover, the probability of losing either a primary or a
general election is larger than in the reference group.
The selection effect is visualized by coefficient paths. In Figure 4 we show only the
paths for the main effects. Each path indicates the penalized estimates subject to tuning
parameter ζ2, where the abscissa is transformed by log(1 + ζ2). The paths illustrate how
the estimates changes towards zero for increasing ζ2. Hence, they show the effects of
covariates on the terminating events when penalization is increased. The dashed black
line indicates the value of ζ2 that was chosen via cross-validation.
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Variable Description
Time Time spent in the unemployment spell, measured in months.
The spells which lasted more than 36 months have been truncated on
36 months and denoted as censored
Nationality Nationality of the unemployed person
0: German, 1: Foreigners
Gender Gender of the unemployed person
0: Male, 1: Female
Age of the unemployed person at the beginning of the unemployment spell
Age young 0: no, 1: yes (≤ 25 years)
Age old 0: no, 1: yes (> 50 years)
Training Unemployed individual has successfully completed a professional training
0: yes, 1: no
University Unemployed individual has an university degree or equivalent qualification
0: no, 1: yes
Table 3: Description of the variables of the unemployment data.
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Figure 5: Plots corresponding to the unemployment data.
5.2 Unemployment Data
In this section, the proposed penalized competing risk model is applied to unemployment
data. The data set has originally been analyzed by Kauermann and Khomski (2009).
Based on the German socio economic panel (SOEP; see www.diw.de), individuals who
have been unemployed at least once during the years 1990 to 2000 are considered. If
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Part-time Full-time
ML pen. sd ML pen. sd
Nationality -1.569 -0.317 0.115 0.269 0.125 0.079
Gender 1.115 0.236 0.126 -1.207 -0.847 0.129
Age young 0.371 -0.274 0.133 -0.042 0.088 0.124
Age old -3.501 -0.879 0.156 -0.642 -0.746 0.179
Training 0.547 -0.023 0.069 -1.058 -0.389 0.142
University 3.043 1.360 0.380 0.757 0.483 0.189
Nationality:Gender 0.428 0 0.028 -0.251 0 0.047
Nationality:Age young -2.851 0 0.007 -0.029 0 0.033
Nationality:Age old -1.534 0 0.007 -5.104 0 0.021
Nationality:Training 0.414 0 0.015 0.299 0 0.016
Nationality:University -0.343 -0.350 0.230 -2.618 -0.898 0.393
Gender:Age young -1.135 -0.090 0.052 0.468 0.222 0.122
Gender:Age old -2.278 -0.188 0.080 -0.711 -0.166 0.091
Gender:Training -0.645 0 0.010 0.777 0 0.019
Gender:University -1.324 0 0.069 -1.020 0 0.093
Age young:Training -0.204 0 0.024 0.432 0 0.041
Age old:Training 0.977 0 0.040 -1.407 0 0.107
Age young:University -5.885 0 0.045 0.876 0 1.073
Age old:University 0.671 0 0.063 -0.959 0 0.125
Training:University -0.822 0 0.049 0.959 0 0.033
Table 4: Parameter estimates for the unemployment data. Ordinary maximum like-
lihood estimates are denoted by “ML”, the penalized estimates are denoted by “pen.”.
Estimated standard errors for the penalized model obtained by a bootstrap approach are
given in the columns denoted by “sd”.
more than one spell of unemployment occurred for an individual, only one spells was
chosen to guarantee independence of the observations. The events that terminate an
unemployment spell are part-time reemployment (r = 1) and full-time reemployment
(r = 2). All other reasons for terminating unemployment are considered as censored.
The dependent variable is defined by the transition process of an individual up to
one of the competing events part-time or full-time reemployment with the duration
until the occurrence of one of the competing events measured in months. The maximal
observation length in the data was 36 months. The available covariates, measured at
the beginning of the unemployment spell, are nationality, gender, age, education and
training. We use the publicly available version of the data that is part of the R add-on
package CompetingRiskFrailty, which can be obtained from the CRAN archive. The
explanatory variables that will be used for modeling are listed in Table 3.
The available data set consists of 500 unemployed persons. To be on comparable
scales, all covariates were standardized to have equal variance. We use all the covariates
described in Table 3 and included all pairwise interaction effects. The used penalty term
is a version of (7) and is given by
J(β0,γ) = ζ1
2∑
r=1
36∑
t=2
(β0tr − β0,t−1,r)2 +
√
2ζ2
20∑
j=1
∥∥γ j∥∥ . (16)
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In analogy to the previous example the penalty term enforces smooth cause-specific
baseline effects and variable selection of the covariate effects including the interactions.
Since the adaptive version of the penalty did not show better performance we used the
simpler version without weights. Tuning parameters ζ1 and ζ2 were chosen by 5-fold
cross validation based on the predictive deviance. The resulting tuning parameters were
ζ1 = 1.0 and ζ2 = 7.42. The cross validation score for fixed value ζ1 = 1.0 is shown in
Figure 5a, where the vertical black dashed line marks the chosen tuning parameter.
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Figure 6: Estimated cause-specific hazard rates over time for the transition to part-time
reemployment and full-time reemployment.
Parameter estimates for the cause-specific time-varying baseline effects are shown
in Figure 5b. The corresponding confidence intervals have again been estimated by
a nonparametric bootstrap method with 1000 bootstrap replications. Due to the small
value of ζ1 the baseline effects are less smooth than in the Congressional careers example.
Table 4 shows the ordinary ML estimates and the estimates resulting from the penal-
ized competing risk model with their corresponding standard errors. It is immediately
seen that the penalization method removes a considerable number of effects, that is, 22
out of 40 parameters leading to a enormous reduction of the model complexity. But all
main effects and three interaction effects remain in the model. One sees, for example,
that for women it is more likely to get a part-time job and less likely to get a full-time
job. For younger people, getting a full-time job is more likely to end unemployment
than getting a part-time job.
Figure 6 depicts a selection of resulting hazard rates. In particular, Figure 6a shows
the hazard functions for a middle-aged German men with a professional training and
no university degree for the transitions to Part-time reemployment and Full-time reem-
ployment. That means, that all characteristics are set at reference. For a transition to
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Figure 7: Coefficients paths of the main effects for the unemployment data.
full-time reemployment the hazard rate shows the typical pattern of unemployment data
with a short increase and slow decrease. The hazard rate for the transition to part-time
reemployment is rather constant at the beginning of the observation period but increases
after a duration time of 25 months. It can be seen from Figure 6b that fewer women
than men get a full-time job , whereas slightly more women get a part-time job, holding
everything else fixed. A transition to a university degree clearly increases the probability
of getting a full-time or part-time job.
For illustration Figure 7 shows the coefficient paths of the main effects. Each path
indicates the penalized estimates subject to tuning parameter ζ2 for ζ1 = 1.0. In partic-
ular, the paths illustrate how the estimates change towards zero for increasing ζ2. The
dashed black line indicates the ζ2 chosen via cross-validation and the resulting estimates.
6 Concluding Remarks
In competing risk models for discrete duration time, one is interested in the the cause-
specific hazard rates. When modeling these cause-specific hazard rates, each explanatory
variable is linked to a group of parameters. The proposed penalization method enforces
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the simultaneous shrinkage of parameters belonging to such a group. A parameter group
even can be completely removed from the model yielding variable selection instead of
parameter selection. Moreover, the proposed method allows that parameters represent-
ing the cause-specific baseline hazards vary over time. In order to avoid that adjacent
parameters of the baseline effects have completely different values, an additional penalty
term is incorporated that steers the smoothness of the baseline effects.
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